


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28 May 1959



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HP 70-2
DATE: 1/14/70 REVIEWER:

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

28 May 1959

DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

No
*USSR: Khrushchev warned in a 26 May speech at Tirana that establishment of US missile bases in Italy and Greece would invite Communist countermeasures, pointing out that short-range "rockets" could reach these targets from Albania and Bulgaria. He implied that in any event the USSR could retaliate with long-range missiles based elsewhere in the bloc. The US Embassy in Moscow believes that one purpose of the reference to missiles in Albania and Bulgaria could be a Soviet attempt to line up Yugoslavia in favor of a nuclear-free zone. Khrushchev renewed a proposal originally made by Bulgarian Premier Yugov in January 1958, that nuclear weapons and missiles be prohibited in the Balkans.

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[Spyros Markezinis, leader of a minor Greek opposition party, has been publicizing such a ban for Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, and Rumania on the basis of his interviews with Khrushchev and Mikoyan a month ago. Greek public reaction to Markezinis is likely to influence Greek Government decisions on future measures in the field of atomic armaments.]

No
Watch Committee conclusion--Berlin: No significant indications bearing on the possibility of hostilities.

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OK
USSR-UAR: The Soviet Union has offered to build the entire Aswan High Dam in less time and at less cost than originally estimated, according to the Cairo press. A number of Western experts are scheduled to review the Soviet construction plans, which involve some substantial changes in previous concepts as to how the dam would be built. Soviet specialists will

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participate in these discussions, after which Cairo will decide whether or not to accept Moscow's offer. The USSR probably hopes its offer will improve political relations between the two countries as well as preclude Western participation in the project. Cairo, however, will probably still attempt to obtain some degree of Western participation.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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No Watch Committee conclusion--Asia-Africa: Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which would jeopardize US interests exist in Laos and in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq and Iran. The situation in the Middle East remains precarious, but a deliberate initiation

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of large-scale hostilities is unlikely in the immediate future.

Nº
Iraq: The Communists have reduced their public pressures for legalization and participation as a party in the cabinet in the face of Qasim's current opposition to these demands. They will probably concentrate for the present on strengthening their position by other means. [redacted]

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OK
Laos: [The government is considering an attack on the rebellious Pathet unit and suppression of the Communist-dominated Neo Lao Hak Zat (NLHZ) party. The British fear such measures would undermine London's efforts to prevent the reconvening of the International Control Commission.]

[The Laotian Army has reports that demobilized former Pathet Lao soldiers have left their villages and are regrouping in many provinces. Prince Souphannouvong, chief of the NLHZ, reportedly disavowed the actions of the mutinous battalion on 25 May and requested government permission to appeal personally to its officers.] [redacted]

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III. THE WEST

OK
Haiti: The tenuous political stability which has existed during recent months may give way to renewed unrest and violence if President Duvalier's illness is as serious as reported. Dissident elements, encouraged by the possibility of the President's death or prolonged illness, could spark sufficient unrest to topple the weak and unpopular government. [redacted]

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Laotian Government Inclined to Suppress Communist
Front Party [REDACTED]

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(The Laotian Government is considering military action to destroy the rebellious Pathet Lao battalion, and is becoming disposed to suppress the Communist-front Neo Lao Hak Zat (NLHZ). An attack on the battalion might do little more than to disperse it, [REDACTED]

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(The Laotian Army has reports that demobilized former Pathet Lao soldiers in many provinces are regrouping, but it is unclear whether they are attempting to evade anticipated government repression or whether they have been ordered to resume guerrilla warfare. [REDACTED]

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(The British have expressed concern that any harsh anti-Communist actions by the Laotian Government would undermine British efforts to oppose the Communist-bloc campaign to reconvene the International Control Commission in Laos. London probably feels that these actions would be construed by international opinion as a violation of the Geneva agreement prohibition of reprisals against the former Pathet Lao.)

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III. THE WEST

Haitian President's Illness May Spark Serious Unrest

The sudden serious illness of Haitian President Duvalier may endanger the tenuous political stability which has existed in Haiti since the abortive seven-man invasion attempt last July. The government has minimized the President's illness,

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[REDACTED]

Opposition elements, which have recently become increasingly active inside Haiti as well as abroad, may now be encouraged to move against the weak and unpopular regime. Although all leading opposition figures are in exile, dissident elements within the country, particularly the followers of former provisional president Daniel Fignolé, have recently engaged in organized acts of harassment, including strikes, against the government. The various groups might combine forces in an attempt to oust the government, but there undoubtedly would be a sharp struggle for power if the government should fall. An attempt to unify the opposition earlier this year failed.

The Duvalier regime has long been almost totally dependent on the President's repressive security police for survival. The armed forces, weakened and alienated by a series of purges designed to eliminate officers of questionable loyalty to Duvalier, could not be relied on to support the government. A prolonged economic and financial crisis and inefficient administration have further weakened the government, and it seems doubtful that the regime could hold together if Duvalier's illness should spark serious disorders.

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